Only epistemologically different entities really exist (even their ED interactions have no ontology)

As I wrote in my previous works (2002-2005-2007, etc.), only the ED entities really exist. Not even their ED interactions do not exist since, without the ED entities, these interactions would not happened. However, in these processes (interactions between entities form the same EW) do not have their ontology exactly as motion does not exist in itself. As I published in the past, there are no laws at all; there are only the ED entities. Certain correspondences between ED entities do not have any ontological status.

As I published in the past, even in the same EW, for instance the macro-EW, there are certain macro-entities which do not exist for other macro-entities. In the end, it depends the interactions between entities which indicate what entities really exist in that EW or in that system within an EW (see my previous work, March 2025).[1] An entity (macro-entity or micro-entity) really exists only because of its interactions with the entities from the same EW. Nevertheless, the electromagnetic field (an EW) really exists in itself and for itself. The mind (entity and EW) is in itself and for itself. So, some ED entities exist only at their surface. (see my previous works)

• The mind/life (as entity and EW) is at “surface”, i.e., there is only “surface” for the self since any knowledge is the self. A cell exists only at surface since in its “interior”, the cell does not exist. So, it seems that the evolution for the living entities has taken place exactly for a living entity to play the “best game” for surviving in its “external” environment. The cell or the human/living organism receives “information” or sensorial inputs from the sensory-motor mechanisms only for external surviving. Even the pain of a teeth is somehow an “external information”. A neuron really is in its environment (the rest of the brain). It survives in its environment because of the external inputs.

The same is available for any human body (which corresponds to a human life). A human subject does not feel internally her heart or leaver. The pain is not inside the body or inside of an “internal organ”, it is the mind. Due to the evolution of species, there are no internal mechanisms of sensorial perception for any living entity; moreover, any material entity (except the electromagnetic field) exists at surface. All those “five” perceptual mechanisms are for the external inputs! There is no internal mechanism for “perceiving” internal inputs. Being the mind, the “internal knowledge” has been created during the development and the entire life of any human being. It is an implicit (not explicit) knowledge (any knowledge is the mind-EW). Again, as an argument for supporting these ideas: a neuron has no pain! The self/mind/life is not the sum of all these feelings, thoughts, etc. On the contrary, each thought, pain, feeling is the self-EW.

• Is the body of a child of three years old the same with the body of the same “person” at age 30? Many cells have been replaced by other cells; neurons have changed lot of inputs-outputs. Are the same neurons? If we believe there are not the same neurons, that person has no personal identity. Somebody can say: within the EDWs perspective, the personal identity is the mind/life which corresponds to that macro-elements (internal/external organs) and the organism does not even exist. The problem is there is no line between the internal and the external organs. The organism is the organism for life-EW. From the viewpoint of life, there is only one organism, that body since there is only one life of that “person”. However, the heart has a totally different function than the liver (more exactly, the function of the hearth to push (cells) blood to the other “internal” organs). We cannot consider that the heart is the same thing with the liver or neither of them exists. Otherwise, we have to reject also the existence of each body… Therefore, from the viewpoint of their interactions, both these (and other) “internal” organs exist. The surgical operation in replacing a heart of a patient with a hearth of a donator would not be possible if those two hearts do not exist. Again, somebody can claim a human body does not exist, but the liver does not correspond to any life. If that person does not accept the existence of his organism, it would mean he has no life. Walking on a street, he could claim his body does not exist; or hitting a wall with his head and claiming that the pain he has because of this fact is just an illusion (or a word/concept “in the air”). That pain is his mind/life, it is not the pain of his mind/life. (This difference is very important, I due to Waxman in his interpretation of Kant’s transcendentalism – see my work 2007/2008.)

Any human being has the “feeling of the unity” of his body, but this feeling is an implicit knowledge; due to this feeling, the human body properly interacts with the external environment and the corresponding life survives in itself and for itself indirectly because of these proper interactions Is has to be very clear: any entity exists or is only at “surface”, either for proper interactions with its environment (material ED entities, except the electromagnetic field which exists in itself) or for the living in itself/for itself (the living entities). This existence or being at “surface” furnishes the unity of that entity.

• As I wrote in my previous works, the whole-parts relationship depends on the viewpoints of interaction and/or correspondences.[2] I repeat: there are certain entities from the same EW which do not exist one for the other in certain relationships. One stone interacts with another stone here on the “surface of Earth”, but these stones do not exist for the Sun, only the Earth, as planet, exists for the Sun but the stones and the planets are certain macro-entities which belong to the macro-EW. The unity of an entity (like micro or macro-entity) is given by the interactions between that entity and other entities from the same EW. However, the interactions do not exist in themselves…
• Higgs indicates that the mass of a microparticle is given by its interaction with the Higgs microparticles. I believe we have to relate the mass of an entity with its extension; but it is not only the mass related to its extension (since there are photons or electromagnetic field which have extensions but not mass). It is the identity of an entity given by its
• interactions with other entities or
• by its correspondences to certain ED entities or the hypercorrespondence to EW0 (Hypernothing) (the field-EW hypercorresponds to the EW0).
• I strongly emphasize again here: 14 billion-years ago, there were many Big Bangs (at the same period or not). Probabilistically speaking, there was (has been) the pre-Big-Bang-EW and so on. The first-EW is the EW0 or Hypernothing (nothing) with no ontology, only hyperontology. However, we can assume, with certain scientific arguments, before the Big Bang(s), there was nothing. The electromagnetic field (the field-EW) has appeared in a certain hypercorrespondence to “nothing” (the EW0 in this case). There is no causality between “nothing” and the field-EW since this field appeared in itself and for itself. Moreover, according to Parmenides, from nothing, nothing appears. Indeed, within the EDWs, any causality between nothing (the EW0) and the field-EW is rejected; there is only correspondence but not causality. Anyway, causality, laws, forces cannot even exist. (see my previous works) Ontologically speaking, there are only ED entities and these ED entities have certain ED interactions but any “interaction” (force, laws, causality) cannot have an ontological status.
• A brick (an entity) is broken in two smaller parts. That brick does not even exist; there are those two “bricks” (two entities). A person puts together (“unifies”) these two bricks very close; from a distance, it seems to be the same brick as before being broken. However, there are no corresponding “nuclear” interactions/forces between these two parts. On the contrary, before breaking the brick, there were certain nuclear interactions between all those microparticles which corresponded to the entire brick. After breaking the brick in two macro-parts, there are other types of interactions between those two corresponding amalgams of microparticles. As I wrote in my previous article (Theseus ship) a material (or immaterial) entity exists or is (it has “identity”) because

(a) of its interactions with other entities from the same EW

(b) through correspondences to certain ED entities

(c) in itself and for itself (mind-EW or field-EW).

When a person broke that brick in two completely different parts (two smaller bricks), the first brick does not exist anymore because of the first two rules: (a) there are other interactions between those two bricks and between them and their environment (b) there are other types of corresponding interactions between the microparticles.

• A person broke a very small corner/bend (still macro) of a whole-brick (let suppose 1% from that brick). Is the same brick? This question is an abstract (philosophical) one: it depends on the viewpoint of interactions. Anyway, now we can say just that there are two macro-pieces which can interact one with the other or interact with other macro-entities. However, the corresponding microparticles (and their interactions) of that whole-brick has dramatically changed. There has been passed an organizational threshold regarding the interactions among the microparticles which correspond to the entire brick, the whole-brick, but also an ontological-epistemological threshold since there are two macro-entities (two macro-parts) which can interact: the small bend and the rest of the brick. There are different kind of interactions between the microparticles which correspond to the bend and the microparticles which correspond to rest of the brick! Before to break that small bend, among those microparticles (all corresponding to the entire brick) were a different type of interactions. So, the correspondence (no ontology) is an abstract notion which can help us to identify (indirectly, from our viewpoint) an entity but that entity exists without our indirect observation, anyway. The “identity” of an entity is a philosophical question, even if that entity really exists in its EW (or as an EW).
• The Theseus ship is (composed of) 10 pieces of wood. Each piece of wood strongly interacts with two other pieces of wood; there are some nails and glue between them. However, each piece of wood corresponds to an amalgam of microparticles with certain nuclear interactions. The ship has been constructed by a man. He received those 10 pieces of wood, nails, glue in a packet. Do those ten parts of wood exist? Of course, these macro-entities really exist. The man constructs the ship with all those elements. Do those ten parts of wood still exist? Yes, they still exist, but the ship does not exist. If the ship (macro-entity) and those wood parts (macro-entities) exist at the same place, in the same time, there would be an ontological contradiction. The ship is those ten wood parts but “is” clearly indicates that there are two notions/words (ship and woods) only for one entity. In this case, for the constructer, there is those ten wood parts.

The constructer pushes the ship in the Black Sea; he is inside the ship which floats on the water. The water of the entire Black Sea (and Danube, and Atlantic Ocean…) is an entity with its unity. We cannot delineate a macro-drop of water from another macro-drop of water. So, the ship has this function of floating on that water. The problem is those ten wood parts, nails and glue as separate entities do not have this function/property of floating in that way: if the constructer does not know to swim, he surely would be drowned. It is not correct to state that the ship has the property of floating on water in that manner. From my EDWs perspective, I can say no more than, that property of floating in that way is the ship. So, that floating is not a property of that ship, it is that ship. That kind of floating is not a “property” of those ten parts, nails, and glue; it is not even a property of that ship, it is the ship. Since the water is an entity, the entire water (a macro-entity) interacts with the ship as an entity. Without knowing to swim, the constructer would be saved only because of the existence of that ship (not of those ten separated pieces of wood). The ship and those ten parts (all macro-entities) exist but from different viewpoints of interactions even if all belong to the macro-EW.

• If a person break a macro-piece of wood (a single piece of wood) in two sub-parts. Obviously, that whole wood does not exist anymore. There are two macro-pieces of wood, the parts-wood, but not the whole-wood. Let us suppose the person glued those sub-parts together: there is not a return to that whole-wood even if these two parts are very closed linked: there are other corresponding interactions between the microparticles of those two parts than the interactions among the microparticles which correspond to the entire piece of that wood, the whole-wood.
• On the table, there is glass with water. The glass is an entity which interacts with the table. Moreover, inside the glass there is that amount of water (an entity with its unity). That water interacts with (a part of) that glass. Someone takes the glass full of water and spreads the water on the floor. Now there are thousands of drops of water, each being an entity which interacts with the floor.
• Two cars in motion are crashing into each other on the street. The motion of any of those two cars is that car. An engine or a wheel cannot move itself. It means, the motion is not a wheel, the motion is the car in motion. We can say that two cars in motion “crash into each other”; we cannot reject the existence of a car in motion since motion is that car. Motion is not a “property of a car” because there would be a problem to define the relationship between that car and its property, motion.
• The microparticles (and their interactions) correspond to the electromagnetic field (an entity and an EW). Because of some interactions among certain microparticles, other microparticles appear spontaneously from “vacuum”. In reality, these new microparticles appear because of the correspondence to the electromagnetic field.
• The photoelectric effect: there is a metallic macro-plate. We send a light (photons and wave in two EDWs) toward
• an amalgam of microparticles (electrons and protons, for instance)
• a concentration of electromagnetic field

which correspond to the macro-plate. The light (in both EDWs) does not exist for the macro-plate; the light interacts with the microparticles (the micro-EW) and that concentration of the electromagnetic field (the field-EW). An electron is rejected from the “macro-plate” (amalgam of microparticles which corresponds to the macro-plate). Is the same macro-plate? This is about the “identity” of that macro-plate, a “philosophical”/linguistic question. From my viewpoint, I know that an electron “evaded” from that amalgam of microparticles. However, we can claim that that macro-plate is still the same since there has not been passing any ontological-epistemological threshold in those ED interactions.

• Is a living tree an entity? Obviously, the tree (roots in the ground, wood-body, all branches and leaves) is an entity with its “identity” which corresponds to a life (an immaterial life-EW). A leave of that tree is not an entity in itself. If a leave falls down on the ground, it is not that tree anymore; there are two entities now: the tree and that “dead” leave. A leave which is not (part of) a tree does not corresponds to any life. The roots of the tree are that tree even if there are strong connections between roots and the ground.[3]

There is a tree who has grown up quite close to a much bigger and older tree. After several years of its growing, we can notice that the smaller/younger tree is inclined toward left, therefore, the distance between the wood bodies of those two trees are larger toward their peaks. It is sure, without the bigger tree near it, the smaller tree would have grown quite straight/vertical on the ground. Because of the bigger tree, the smaller tree has grown inclined/tilted. Can we conclude that smaller tree has an “intelligence”? Somebody can argue, there are only certain physical processes in all these processes and entities; in this case, we can say any tree has no life. However, any biologist would tell you a tree has life. From my viewpoint, life is mind. For the human beings, there are no consciousness; for the living trees, there are no consciousness. Has this life any role in the movement of the corresponding tree? Obviously it has; without the bigger tree near it, the smaller/younger tree would have grown quite vertical on the ground. It is not a (aware) “decision” of that tree to grown inclined, but surely, through correspondence, life has a major role in that inclined grown of its corresponding wood-body.

• There are no “absolute rule” for the existence of an entity. I discovered the EDWs (the ED entities): material (macro- or micro-entities) and immaterial (any mind-EW), discrete (micro or macro-entities) or continue (electromagnetic field or the mind), entities which exist due to their interactions with other entities from the same EW (macro or micro-entities) or entities which exists in itself (field or mind). Probabilistically speaking, there are other EDWs, other ED entities but we have no idea about them, yet. Certainly, there are ED entities which will never know. The problem is that there are entities from the same EW (for instance, the macro-EW) which do not exist one for the other. (see my article about Theseus ship, March 2025) Each entity exists/is either from the viewpoint of certain interactions or in/for itself. Anyway, all the ED entities are in hypercorrespondence to the EW0, the Hypernothing. The EDWs pre-Big Bangs are still just probabilistically hypothesis, we do not know any such EDW yet. I am convinced (not a scientific statement) there will be discovered certain EDWs before the Big Bangs in the next decades, centuries. However, I have furnished completely strong scientific and philosophical arguments for the existence of certain ED entities like field-EW, micro- macro- mega-entities and the mind. I furnished strong arguments for certain systems of entities which do not exist one for the other even if there are in the same EW. For instance, a stone does not exist for the Sun, but that stone exists for anther stone on the Earth. The Earth is all these stones, water, ground, etc. for the Sun since both are, in this case, macro-planets. Obviously, we know already that the Sun as a planet corresponds to a huge concentration of electromagnetic field (the field-EW) and to a huge amalgam of microparticles (the micro-EW). But the Sun and the Earth are macro-planets in the macro-EW.

Acknowledgments

Many thanks to Cristian Holban (student 2022-2025, Philosophy, Bucharest University) for the discussions we have had in the last three years; these discussions have helped me to improve quite a lot my EDWs perspective.

[1] Nagel has a book: “A view from nowhere” (1986). I have not read this book, but I believe Nagel argues that there is no such viewpoint. Since God cannot even exist (see my work) and infinite cannot exist (see Aristotle), then there has to be “a view from nowhere”, but the problem is that “nowhere” has no ontology, therefore even this slogan is quite wrong. I am sure Nagel (a very intelligent philosopher) intentionally selected this wrong slogan.

[2] Anyway, Locke was right: the mind is “tabula rasa”, there are only innate mechanisms for acquiring, through development and living, certain particular knowledge, but there is no innate concepts/ideas/knowledge.

[3] There are strong connections between my lungs and the air from my office: without that air, I would die in a few minutes…