The “Theseus ship” and my EDWs perspective (more details)

The “Theseus ship”: a ship is composed of 10 pieces of wood. We replace a piece of wood, is the same ship? We replace two pieces of wood, is the same ship? We replace nine pieces of wood, is the same ship?

From the EDWs perspective, I furnished the answer in my previous works. In this article, I give more details.

• When we consider the ship is composed of 10 pieces, there are two notions (ship and pieces) which refer to the same entity/entities. Since there is an identity between ship and those pieces (or the pieces “composed” the ship, both the ship and the referring to the macro-entities), only the pieces really exist. There have been used a special clay and nails for strongly linking those pieces. Can we still consider that there are only those pieces of wood? Yes, we can, we have to add the clay and the nails to that composition.

On the contrary, from the viewpoint of the water of the Black Sea (for instance), there are no pieces of wood, no clay, no nails. The water interacts with the ship as a whole. So, the final answer to Theseus’ ship: it depends on the point of view we ask the question. If we ask the question from the viewpoint of a microparticle, neither the ship, nor those wood pieces exist; for the microparticles, there is a huge amalgam of microparticles. For the electromagnetic field (present everywhere in this “Cosmos”, there are neither the pieces of wood, nor the ship, nor the microparticles; there is just a part of that field which is more concentrated.

In my EDWs, I reconciled epistemology with ontology: there is no distinction between these notions when we refer to the entities of EDWs. For instance, an electron has no idea about epistemology but it exists/ontology... the electron interacts with other microparticles, interaction being ontology=epistemology for the microparticle the same for a planet... This is the reason for the name EDWs... epistemology=ontology for planets, electrons, etc. for humans, the problem is more complicated. However, we do not interact with macro or micro, we do not know directly such entities... our mind does not interact with its body because it does not exist for the body. Therefore, the distinction epistemology-ontology is quite wrong. This distinction comes from Greek philosophy and before these philosophers, it was strongly related to Religion; such wrong religiously distinctions have mirrored the God-humans distinction and Plato’s “Ideas-phenomena” or Kant’s “noumena-phenomena”. There are not only the EDWs that I indicated in the past, there are other undiscovered EDWs. However, we have to add the viewpoint from which we ask the question: “what do really exist?”. As I will show below, even within the same EW, there are same entities which exist for other entities but all these entities do not exist for other entities from the same EW.

There are certain EDWs but there are no general, absolute rules/principles for the existence of the ED entities or the EDWs. However, there are some “forever truths”:

• each mind-EW has to correspond to something material, otherwise, it could not even exist;
• the pain is the mind-EW.
• any stone corresponds to an amalgam of microparticles with which it interacts,

Those micro-entities really exist in the micro-EW. Also the stone exists in its relationships with other stones in the same macro-EW. But that stone does not exist for the Sun since for the Sun only the planet Earth exists because of their interaction through “gravity” (see my previous works about gravity). So, there are no general, absolute rule for the existence/being of the ED entities. There are the different kinds of entities even within the macro-EW: the stone exists for other stones, but not for the Sun, even if both the stone and the Sun are macro-entities.

• A car and its macro-parts (in my previous works, I wrote about this topic). I consider that a macro-car is the sum of its macro-parts even if the car is in rest or in motion. In motion, the mass of the car increases; moreover, the car in motion has the property of moving (not “actual” (only potential) for the car in rest). It would be quite wrong to consider that the car in motion is not the same entity as the car in rest.[1] Is my body in motion other body than I rest on a chair? Quite absurd question… The car in motion is an entity (= sum of its macro-parts) which interacts with the street. Both the car (= its sum of macro-parts) in rest/in motion and the street really exist in the macro-EW. The car (with a driver) is in motion. Does the body of the driver exist? It depends from which viewpoint we ask the question: the body of the driver interacts with the chair on which he is sitting; therefore, his body really exists for that chair, but these two entities are in no in motion one relative to the other. The car in motion has a “function”: motion, but “motion” is just a function with no ontology; this function is not even a property of that car like its mass (in relationship to other macro-entities). Obviously, this function is not a function of some parts of the car (an engine or a wheel cannot move). Nevertheless, this function is just a “function” without any ontology. It means, only the macro-entities which composed the car really exist and the sum of all these macro-components are the car. The sum of parts are the whole, in this case. All the macro-components of the car (that are the car) are associated (no ontology) with the motion of the car (motion has no ontology, motion does not exist exactly as the ED interactions do not have ontology (do not exist in themselves) but involve the ED entities (which really exist)).

There are EDWs like the macro-EW, the micro- and the field-EW, but there are macro-entities, for instance, which do not exist in relationship with other entities from the same macro-EW. What is the general rule for material entities, for instance? There are no general rules. With my EDWs perspective, I have explained what we really have certain empirical knowledge. Even the principles of my EDWs are quite relative since there is no absolute rule in my EDWs perspective.

• The Sun interacts with the Earth through “gravity” because of their masses (see my previous works). The mass of the Earth is the sum of all the material macro-entities which “composed” the Earth but not for everything since the stones (for instance) do not exist for the Sun. These macro-entities are the Earth but these macro-entities do not exist for the Sun. A stone on the Earth exists for another stone on Earth but these stones do not exist for the Sun since the Sun interacts with the Earth as a whole. Again, all the macro-entities composed the Earth (sum of parts = whole), but it is meaningless to talk about a stone on the Earth in relationship to/interaction with the Sun.
• If a rocket flies from the Earth, that rocket does not exist (for the Sun) when it is still enough close to the Earth (see my previous works). If the distance between the Earth and the rocket increases considerably (tens or hundreds of kilometers, I do not know exactly), that rocket will be another entity which interacts directly with the Sun and the Earth. Any stone, the Earth, the Sun correspond to the same electromagnetic field (an entity and EW, the field-EW) which exists in itself and for itself (like any mind/life). Each electromagnetic wave (for instance, a wave which correspond to two particles) is part of this electromagnetic field. (more details in my previous works)
• Your body when you were 3 years old is not exactly the same as your body at 40, some of its properties has continuously changed. However, it does not mean you have “another” body (in relationship to your mind which is the same your entire life). If I eat something in the morning, it does not mean I “have” another body than yesterday.[2] (for more details, see my previous works again)
• A cell (a macro-entity) corresponds to a life-EW. That cell (its body) exists in relationship with other cells, the macro-molecules, etc. That cell is an entity which does not exist for the body; if we consider that both the cell and the body exist, there would be an ontological contradiction. We can say that all the cells (certain macro-entities) composed/are the body (a macro-entity). From and external viewpoint, maybe we can claim this statement. The problem is that from the “viewpoint” of the life-EW of a cell, the body does not even exist. Neither the body of that cell exists, but the cell-life-EW corresponds to a cell, not to organism; an EDW, the organism-life-EW corresponds to the organism. Moreover, the cell-life-EW isn’t for the organism-life-EW: one life does not exist (is not) for any other life. Because of the correspondence between (a) a cell and its life (b) the organism and its life, we know that
• the body of the cell really exists (as macro-entity) in its interactions with other cells
• the organism exists (as a macro-entity) in its interactions with other macro-entities
• the cells do not exist for the body (from the viewpoint of the corresponding lives of cells and body).

So, even if the cells and the organism are macro-entities, the cells (macro-entities) do not exist for the body (macro-entity) for the viewpoint of every macro-entity. These entities belong to the same macro-EW (which it is just a label, it does have any ontology), so these entities are no ED entities. However, the cells do not exist for the body and vice-versa at least because a cell and the body correspond to different lives, i.e., two EDWs.

These are the EDWs (the ED entities) but there are no general, “absolute” rules for these existences/beings. However, I reject pragmatism or functionalism as alternative to “ontology”. I strongly emphasized in 2002-2005-2007 that there are only the ED entities (the macro-EW and the micro-EW being just labels) without spacetime, but also the electromagnetic field (which is an entity and EW). In general (but not absolute, i.e., for any entity), the sum of certain macro-components of a macro-entity are that entity, a particular sum of microparticles corresponds to a macro-entity, but not in all cases.

As I indicated in 2005-2007 and later, there are no forces or laws of “nature” since there are, ontologically speaking, only ED entities, nothing else (interactions do not exist in themselves).  Moreover, being such EDWs, there is no spacetime: even if I used notion like “spacetime” for the macro-EW and the micro-EW in my works 2008-2012, I was aware that spacetime could not exist just because of the existence of ED entities and mainly because the electromagnetic field (an entity and EW) covers the entire “cosmos”. In 2016, I explicitly showed that spacetime could not even exist. There is no absolute rule when an entity really exist or is.

An entity exists:

(a) in interactions with the entities from the same EW

(b) in correspondences to the ED entities (from the EDWs) at one moment or a period of “time”

or

(c) in itself (the material electromagnetic field, each immaterial mind/life, both being an entity and an EW).[3]

(d) in a system (as a whole) with certain parts (as its parts), the whole and its parts belong to the same EW but, in some cases, a whole-entity does not exist for its parts (other entities) from the same EW.

So, there are EDWs but also systems (sub-systems) which belong to the same EW. Such system/sub-systems do not belong to an EDW.

A material entity does not interact with other entity because of their masses. For instance, a photon do not have mass but it can interact with an electron (which has mass). So, mass is not a condition for interactions among the material/physical entities. Anyway, an entity from a particular EW does not exist for an entity which belongs to an EDW.

• All the mental states are the mind (entity and EW), so it would be meaningless to talk about the interactions between one mental state and another mental states or one mental state and the mind since the mind is an immaterial EW.
• A human person hits a wall with one of his legs; he has a pain (see my previous works). Who produced the pain? Not the interaction between his leg and the wall: the pain (any pain) is neither in the leg, nor in the brain (neurons do not have pain). The pain is the mind-EW (not part of the mind) and there is no material cause for that pain (since any pain is the mind-EW). The cause of the pain is the correspondence between the mind-EW and the body-wall interaction (entities in the macro-EW). As I strongly illustrated in the past: for Kant (transcendental idealism), “the world is not my world; the world is the self” (Waxman) (see my PhD thesis 2007 and my book 2008). In the same way, the pain of my leg is not “my” pain, the pain is the mind-EW. This pain does not corresponds to my leg or to my brain; it corresponds to the entire body (and its interactions with the macro-environment).
• Within the EDWs perspective, I showed that there are no “multimodal interactions” (see my previous works): a human subject perceives a green car in motion. The ears send signals to the parietal zone, the eyes send signal to the occipital zone (anyway, both types of signals spread immediately in the entire brain). There are no multimodal interactions between these two different signals (from ears and eyes) just because the mind-EW corresponds to the entire brain and body. Because of this correspondence, there is no need for a mechanism which unifies the activities of neurons from the parietal zone with activities of neurons from the occipital zone just because the mind-EW corresponds to the entire brain and body (and its interactions with the macro-environment).

In this context, I repeat: the conditions for the existence and being of ED entities (physical/material and immaterial entities or “entities” in general) illustrated by me in my last works are not absolute. I have written and changed these conditions in the last 20 years just because there are no absolute such rules. I illustrate these changeable conditions under the context of actual knowledge. In the future, probabilistically speaking, there would be discovered certain EDWs, certain ED entities that we do not have any idea in our days. Therefore, these conditions for are only relative to the actual knowledge in particular sciences and philosophy.

It seems that if an entity is also an EW, that entity exists/is in itself and for itself, i.e., there are no other entities which exist/is for that entity. For the mind-EW (immaterial entity), it is absolute compulsory this entity to correspond to a material entity (or amalgam of material entities). It is quite impossible a mind/life-EW to be without a corresponding brain/body. However, the field-EW corresponds to (hyper)nothing (the EW0) which has a hyperontology. (see my Hypermetaphysics 2023) The entities with mass exist, in general, in interactions with other entities from the same EW. The entities without mass exist either in interactions with other entities (photons) or in itself (electromagnetic field or mind/life). (About the difference between “mass” and “gravity”, see for instance my previous work, March 2025).

Can somebody claim that my EDWs perspective (with new details) push us toward a kind of skepticism? I reject any kind of skepticism or pragmatism; my EDWs is an “ontological-epistemological” perspective referring to exactly the entities which exist or which are. If the reader does not believe me, than he can hits his head to a wall. In normal conditions, he will have a pain. That pain is the self; this is a real fact/entity/phenomena. So, in some “standard/normal” conditions, we can know when an entity really exists/is or not. As I wrote in the past, the river Danube or the Black Sea does not exist as an entity (we cannot delineate the water of a river Danube from the water of the Black Sea since we can delineate the water of the river and the water of the sea in the margin of Danube Delta exactly…). However, a drop of water on the floor really exists and interacts with that floor. If I push air in the wheel of a car, it does not mean that wheel is now other wheel; when I breathe air in my lungs, it does not mean, there are other lungs and “my” life corresponds to another body. If I push air in a wheel, it does not mean there is other wheel or other car.

In general, any entity continuously changes its properties, but it does not mean, there is another entity. A brick looks quite different after 100 years, but it does not mean it is other brick. These chances can pass the organizational and or ontological-epistemological thresholds (see my previous works): if there is passed an organizational threshold, the entity has the same identity (even if the values of its properties has changed); if there is passed an ontological-epistemological threshold, that entity would not exist anymore and, possible, other entities or process (in the same EW or in an EDW) would appear.

• The changes in the electromagnetic field correspond to the behavior of the microparticles (nonlocality or entanglement, for instance), but such correspondences are much less evident for the behavior of the macro-entities. However, since spacetime could not even exist, the trajectories of galaxies/planets correspond to the curvature of the electromagnetic field which surrounds the concentration of the same electromagnetic field (which corresponds to a planet). An apple falls down on the Earth (both macro-entities within the macro-EW) following a “curved nothing” (no ontology) which corresponds to the curved electromagnetic field (the field-EW). This is the reason, there is nonlocality or entanglement between two (or more) microparticles and there is no such entanglement/nonlocality between two macro-entities. Or, at least, we cannot observe directly such corresponding “influences”. The same situation is for
• dark matter: there is a correspondence between the galaxies and the entities from the mega-EW;
• dark energy: there is a correspondence between the electromagnetic field and the galaxies/planets or/and between this field and certain entities from the mega-EW.

In this context, I consider that as an entity, the electromagnetic field does not exist for the macro-entities exactly as the microparticles do not exist for the macro-particles (and vice-versa).

How many EDWs are? Obviously, I cannot know: there are field-EW, micro-EW, macro-EW, mega-EW, mind-EW, there is my lambda-EW (just a probabilistic supposition), but surely there are other EDWs. In my article March 2025, I indicated about the lambda-EW (my lambda is an EW, the Λ-EW, included in the EDWs perspective). This is not an absolute speculation, but a kind of probabilistic “speculation” based on the probability of the existing many (not infinite) and very different EDWs. In order to understand more about the EDWs, we have to go with our thinking not only beyond the limits of our sensorial-motor mechanics, but also beyond our limits of thinking.

• I tried to go beyond such limits when I wrote about my lambda-EW (see my article March 2025).

If somebody believes there are only the mentioned above EDWs, he/she would return to the “religious” mentality of people believing in “God” (it does not matter which one) or believing in only one continent, in one Solar system, in one Sun, in one galaxy, etc. Therefore, probabilistically speaking, there are not only these EDWs that we know; there are many EDWs (quite different, maybe not only material and immaterial EDWs) that will be discovered in the next decades/centuries/millenniums.

• I have sex with my wife. I am a man, she is a woman. I penetrate her body with my body, a part of my body is inside her body, it strongly interacts with her part of the body. According to the dynamical system approach (van Gelder’s explanation for Watt’s governor), there is no distinction between her body and my body. I finished that sexual act, I have orgasm, usually, a woman do not have orgasm quite easy (like man) in a banal sexual act. Where is the feeling of my orgasm? In my mind, of course. In her mind, she has no such feeling in actual sex. Obviously, my mind does not even exist/is for her mind. I go to have a take a shower. My body is under the shower, the body of my wife is in the bad, she is smoking a cigar. My mind corresponds to my body, her mind corresponds to her body. According to the dynamical system approach, in that sex, there is no distinction between her body and my body. Quite wrong idea. My body is something different than her body. But does a human body exist? Yes, it exist since it corresponds to a mind-EW which is in itself and for itself; moreover, the body directly interacts with certain entities from the same macro-EW. My body is totally different than these macro-entities, i.e., my body is an entity in the macro-EW. My mind is not for my corresponding body. So, it would to quite absurd to believe there is no difference between my body and her body or to claim there is no distinction between her body and my body (at least when we had been in that sexual act). We already know, my body and her body really exist as different entities in the same macro-EW.
• The relationship between the internal organs of my body and the body: does my heart, for instance, really exist? From the viewpoint of my life (which corresponds to my organism), the internal organs do not exist. Anyway, the heart (as “internal organ”) is strongly linked with other internal organs, so to claim that the hearth is a totally different “entity” than all other entities (other internal organs) is quite dubious. The problem is that the hearth has distinct properties and functions than the liver (for instance). So, there has to be a difference between the existences of the hearth and the liver… Inside the organism, there is this difference, but we have to notice that these “internal organs” are strongly linked and it is quite difficult to make a difference between these organs. The hearth has no corresponding life-EW (even if the hearth is composed of cells and each cell corresponds to a life-EW). A person has a surgical operation and his hearth is replaced with another one (from a “donator” who died in a car accident). Is the same body for that patient even if he has anther heart? His body are all his internal and external organs/parts of the body. Therefore, even after his surgical operation, it is the same body for the patient: this change of his body did not pass an ontological-epistemological threshold (not even an organizational one).

The body exists in correspondence to the life/mind/self-EW. The self/I has an external image (part of the I) of the corresponding body. My heart is part of my organism because my life corresponds to the entire organism not to my heart. Without heart, my life could not even be. Without my liver, my life could not even be. However, my heart has no corresponding live (even if each cell of my body corresponds to a particular life, a particular EW). Even after that surgical operation, the life/mind/self of that patient is the same EW. From the viewpoint of his liver, the heart is not the same. From the viewpoint of patient’s life-EW, the heart does not even exist, so the question is meaningless for my life’s viewpoint.

• A fish in the water of a small aquarium: obviously, the fish is as an entity totally different than that amount of water. The body of that fish interacts with the water but it correspond to “its" life-EW. The fish is not “in the water” since the water only surrounds its body, that means the body of that fish and the amount of that water do not occupy the same place at the same time. There is no identity between the water and the fish. Is that amount of water an entity? We can say, that amount of water is a macro-entity with malleable form which interacts with many other macro-entities that are inside the aquarium: fishes, microorganisms, etc.
• The case of those two twin girls (Kristal and Tatiana) that share a single brain: (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R8UJDDece0E) These two twin sisters share parts of the brain, but each has her the body. From my viewpoint, I consider that each of these twin sisters has her own mind (one mind is not for the other mind), but because they share parts of the brain, some “parts” of these minds are quite similar, or maybe there is only one mind for these two bodies. The problem is that (recall the dynamical system approach), we cannot distinguish between the brain and the rest of the body, so we cannot make a “clear distinction” between these two bodies. One sister can read some thoughts of the other sister just because they have a common part of their brains. One can sees through one eye of her sister, the other can see with both eyes of her sister. Each can control her body but also parts of the body of the other: Kristal can move 3 legs and an arm, while Tatiana can a leg and three arms. Each can read the thoughts of the other in their common head. It seems that there are two minds, each corresponding to the same brain but to two bodies even if some parts of the bodies are the same (because the brain is so connected). It is not one brain, there are two brains very connected, each brain connected with its body, but because the brains are so connected, the bodies are connected (for instance the eyes or feelings). However, the minds are two minds with some identical content. “There is evidence that the twins can see through each other's eyes due to brain conjoining. Their thalamiare joined by connector tissue, a ‘thalamus bridge’.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Krista_and_Tatiana_Hogan) The thalamus is involved in sensorial mechanisms, thoughts, awareness, language and cognition. They share touch and taste. Each girl has her thalamus but there is this thalamus bridge between the two thalamus. One brain receives signals from the other and vice-versa. One can see with three eyes, the other can see with all four eyes. One control three legs and an arm, the other three arms and a leg. It means there are two ED minds; clearly, it is not one mind. One mind would see with all for eyes, it would move all eight limbs.

Somebody can claim that talking in their heads it would mean there are not two different minds. From my viewpoint, there is not only one mind: there are two minds but some parts of the corresponding brains are common. Essentially, the common part of their brains is smaller than the rest of each brain. Therefore, each mind is not the same mind; each mind does not share something with the other mind since one EW does not exist (is not) for any EDW. The girls have disagreements in their decisions, therefore, it means there is not one mind, the same mind.

We have to recall that each cell corresponds to the cell-life-EW, but the entire organism corresponds to only one life (the life of an organism is not the sum of the lives of the corresponding cells since one life-EW is not for any EDW-life).

… the twins share one token experience rather than two exactly matching token experiences… combined with the evident overlapping pathways in the twins' brains, arguably implies that the twins share some conscious experiences.  (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Krista_and_Tatiana_Hogan)

From my viewpoint, these twins do not “share conscious experiences” (this statement is quite absurd). Why do they not share the entire conscious experiences? Because there are two mind-EW, not one.

With an astonishing difference, in many ways, the girls share a mind; they literally see the world through each others' eyes. They can also feel and even taste what the other twin experiences -- something that becomes an issue at the dinner table. https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/mar-13-2014-1.2908464/the-hogan-sisters-how-conjoined-twins-share-body-and-mind-1.2908465

Quite wrong: only one of them sees through the eyes of the other; the other sees with both eyes of the other. However, these visual perceptions has to be the mind, but are not the same mind, one mind. Each mind has its own visual perceptions (which are that mind), but there is not only one mind. Each of these girls can perceive what the other perceive, but these perceptions are not the same perception: for each girl, these perceptions are her mind. Each mind is as an EW in itself, i.e., the girls share parts of the brain but they do not share “parts” of their minds.

“One soul in two bodies” (https://www.youtube.com/shorts/MUPBwHblP3w): No, there is not only one soul in these two bodies since each control different limbs, and one cannot see with all four eyes, but other can see with all four eyes. So, there are two minds but each mind corresponds to a brain, to that common part of their brains, and a body. Because there is not one brain: there are two brain connected and, more important, each brain is much more connected to one body than to the other brain. There is not only one mind, but these minds are not somehow connected; one mind is not for the other mind since there are EDWs. Since any mind-EW is immaterial, it is meaningless to ask what parts of their minds are common. The thalamus (and other parts of their brains are unified), but their bodies are not. These two ED minds do not have common parts: each mind corresponds to the main brain (connected to the other brain) and to one body. Because of their brains’ connections, some thoughts, feelings, sensorial data appear in both minds. Each girl has her own personality (personal identity, i.e., the mind/life/EW). There is not only one life, there are two lives, two ED-lives. [4]

• Abby and Brittany twin sisters: (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M36jxR_6lIE) There are two minds, two brains, but a part of their bodies is common. There are two hearts but one circulatory system; what one eats affects the other. However, their minds are EDWs. There are two different “persons”: one loves maths and science, the other reading and writing. During their development, they have learned one to control left part of their body, the other to control the right part. It is clear there are two mind-EDWs and a common part of their bodies.

Conclusion

More than two millennium, the “Theseus ship” has been a paradox; it has been a paradox just because it was constructed within the unicorn world. Those ten macro-woods are the ship. From the viewpoint of the water of the Black Sea, there are no parts of the ship exactly as a stone on Earth does not exist for the Sun. However, the mass of the Earth is the sum of all its stones, water, etc. A mind is an entity and an EW which corresponds to a macro-body in the macro-EW and any body is the “internal” organs and “external parts” of it.[5]

[1] There is not analogy with van Gelder’s example referring to Watt’s “governor”. The Watt’s governor is the sum of its macro-parts indifferently if the governor is in function or in rest. There are different kinds of interactions in these cases, but the governor is the same placed within a macro-environment. (about the dynamical system approach versus computationalism, see my PhD thesis/my book 2008) My example with car and its components is a much better example than Watt’s governor in investigating the parts-whole relationship.

[2] According to the dynamical system approach, each human body is in continuously contact with its environment, it is so “coupled” to the environment that there is no distinction between the body and the environment. Quite wrong idea, from my viewpoint. Any human body is an entity quite distinct than its environment even if there are certain continuously interactions between the body and the environment.

[3] Obviously, there are other rules here… There is only one electromagnetic field (the field-EW), there are many minds/lives on Earth (at least), but one mind is not for any different mind (EDW).

[4] We can make an analogy with the bionic eye. (https://www.fightingblindness.ca/resources/the-bionic-eye/)

[5] The distinction between the internal and the external parts of the body is quite wrong. There is no line which separate these parts of the body.